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I. Introduction1
Excise taxes on fossil fuels have long been an important
source of revenues for both state and federal governments.
States and localities annually receive more than $20 billion
from motor fuels taxes and more than $3 billion in electricity
taxes, in addition to a wide range of other energy related rev-
enues including severance taxes, pipeline taxes, and natural
gas taxes. Various rationales have been advanced to support
the imposition of these taxes, including compensating the
public for expropriating the natural bounty of the land,2 act-
ing as a proxy for user fees or toll charges on the nation's
roads and highways,3 and paying for adverse environmental4
1. An earlier version of this paper was published as Frank Muller and J.
Andrew Hoerner, The Promise of State Carbon Taxes: Opportunities and Policy
Issues, 4 STATE TAx NOTES 530 (1993). The paper was prepared as a result of
work supported by the W. Alton Jones Foundation. The opinions, findings,
conclusions, and recommendations are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Foundation.
2. Severance taxes have their root in the idea that sub-surface mineral
resources belong to the sovereign and that the mining company is required to
compensate the sovereign when those resources are appropriated for private
use. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
3. Thirty-six states and the federal government dedicate some or all of
their motor fuel taxes to transportation through the use of highway trust finds.
THE ROAD INFORMATION PROGRAM (TRIP), STATE HIGHWAY FUNDING METHODS
(1992).
4. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4041(d), 4042, 4081, 9508 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(taxes on gasoline to pay for remediation of leaking underground storage
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/2
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or health 5 consequences associated with the mining, trans-
portation, storage, and consumption of fossil fuels.
The United States has both ratified the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and committed to
the convention's goal of "stabilizing greenhouse gas concen-
trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."6
On Earth Day 1993, President Clinton furthered this goal by
committing the United States to return greenhouse gas emis-
sions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 and to make further
reductions in subsequent years. The President's Climate
Change Action Plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
was largely based on voluntary measures, which he called a
first step "in the face of perhaps the biggest environmental
threat to this planet."7
These expressions of national commitment imply that
the entire range of policies to reduce greenhouse gases, in-
cluding the imposition of energy taxes, will be part of the na-
tional agenda for many years to come. Individual states,
however, had begun implementing measures to reduce emis-
sions of greenhouse gases, most notably carbon dioxide (CO2),
through executive and legislative measures years prior to re-
cent federal pronouncements. Vermont has developed a com-
prehensive plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and non-
renewable energy consumption per capita as a result of a
1989 gubernatorial directive. In 1992, the Connecticut legis-
lature directed that the state energy plan include a C02 emis-
sions reduction goal. Several states, including California and
Minnesota, have developed inventories of their greenhouse
gas emissions. New York, Massachusetts, California, and
Nevada have all assigned explicit monetary costs to C02
tanks); 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Superfund Trust Fund and Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund taxes).
5. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4121, 9501 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (excise on coal
for the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund).
6. Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Conference on Environment and De-
velopment, 5th Sess., Agenda Item 2, at Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part
11)/Add. 1 (1992).
7. President William J. Clinton, Earth Day Address (Apr. 22, 1993).
1994]
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emissions for purposes of doing least-cost electricity plan-
ning. A host of other initiatives are also in place in other
states.8
It is important to note that the state initiatives are not
insignificant with respect to the global effort to control an-
thropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Only six foreign na-
tions release more C02 than Texas. Texas greenhouse
emissions exceed those of countries such as Canada, Poland,
and Mexico. California contributes more to global warming
than Spain, South Korea, or South Africa. Even a relatively
small state like Maryland, with a population of less than five
million, contributes approximately the same level of emis-
sions as Pakistan, whose population in excess of 125 million
makes it the seventh most populous nation on earth.9
The combination of state concern over global climate
change and a tradition of state-level energy taxation has fo-
cussed attention on a tax approach to combatting greenhouse
emissions. Carbon dioxide is currently unregulated and not
readily amenable to traditional tailpipe and chimney-stack
controls or other point source strategies. Carbon dioxide is
an inherent result of fossil fuel combustion, not a by-product,
and is emitted by a myriad of sources from automobiles to
lawnmowers to utility plants. A carbon tax is commonly pro-
posed as a cost-effective way of achieving some degree of
emission reductions across all these sources.
A carbon tax is a levy on fossil fuels at rates proportional
to the carbon content of each fuel. Per unit of energy, coal
has the highest carbon content of the fossil fuels and natural
gas the lowest, with petroleum products in between. The tax
is therefore proportional to the carbon dioxide emissions as-
sociated with each fuel, but also broadly correlates with emis-
sions of the major pollutants regulated by the federal Clean
Air Act.' 0 A carbon tax is not imposed on energy sources such
8. For a review of state initiatives on global warming, see CENTER FOR
GLOBAL CHANGE, Cool Tools: State and Local Policy Options to Confront a
Changing Climate (P. Wexler, ed. 1992), and A. SmBiRGER AND R. GRAVIS, SE-
LECTED SUmmARY OF CuRRENr STATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE (1992).
9. See Appendix I for a comparison of state and national C02 emissions.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
[Vol. 12
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as hydroelectric, nuclear,1 1 solar, wind, or sustainably har-
vested wood.
A carbon tax reduces carbon dioxide emissions in two
ways. First, by increasing fossil fuel prices, it encourages
more efficient use of energy and stimulates development of
zero-emission technologies. Second, by changing relative
prices, it encourages a shift in consumption from coal and oil
to cleaner-burning natural gas. By the same logic, a carbon
tax reduces emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
hydrocarbons.
Relative to traditional state energy taxes like motor fuels
taxes, a carbon tax has a number of advantages:
" The broader base of a carbon tax implies that a re-
quired level of revenue can be raised at a lower tax
rate.' 2
* A carbon tax promotes global and local environmental
quality while raising revenue. This "two-for-one" as-
pect adds to both the policy and the political appeal of
the tax.' 3
" The burden of the tax is broadly distributed over resi-
dential, commercial, and industrial taxpayers. An ap-
propriate share is born by interstate commerce and
tourism.
* The tax is less regressive than motor fuels taxes.
" A carbon tax causes less economic distortion than tradi-
tional excise taxes. Indeed, by "internalizing" the social
cost of pollution, the tax may actually improve eco-
nomic efficiency.
It is difficult to identify another state tax vehicle that
shares the combined advantages of increased economic effi-
11. Because of concern that this strategy may promote new nuclear devel-
opment, many carbon tax advocates argue for an additional tax and the removal
of existing subsidies to account for the risks associated with nuclear power.
12. Moving from single-fuel energy taxes toward a carbon tax is broadly
consistent with the bipartisan tax reform ideology which motivated the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
13. A carbon tax was found to be the most favored energy tax by a Business
Week/Harris poll taken in January 1993. Christopher Power, The Public
Braces for a Hit, Busn-mss WEEK, Feb. 8, 1993, at 29.
19941
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ciency, environmental benefits, improved fairness and sub-
stantial revenue potential. This article will examine the
evolving interest in carbon taxes and provide an analysis of
related fiscal and environmental policy issues. It will also
consider a range of administrative and design issues in light
of concerns over the competitiveness of state industries and
constitutional constraints on state taxation of interstate com-
merce. It will conclude with case studies of carbon tax pro-
posals from Maryland, Minnesota, and California.
II. Evolving Interest in Carbon Taxes
Many nations are considering proposals to restructure
energy taxes to reflect differences in environmental impact.
Interest has been strongest in Europe, where energy taxes
are increasingly seen as an attractive option for reducing
combustion-related emissions that contribute to global and
regional environmental problems. In 1992, the European
Community (EC) agreed to a community-wide hybrid carbon/
energy tax conditioned upon other Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries adopting a
similar tax or other measures having an equivalent financial
impact.14 The tax is a key element of a broader strategy to
achieve the EC's ambitious carbon dioxide emission reduction
target. The tax would be collected by member countries on a
revenue-neutral basis, i.e., other national taxes would be re-
duced to offset the revenue gain. It would be phased in over
seven years to reach the equivalent of $75 per ton of carbon1 5
by the end of the decade. 16
14. For a detailed description of the tax, see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A CoUNcIL DIREcTIvE INTRODUCING A TAX ON CAR-
BON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS AND ENERGY 1 (1992).
15. Throughout this paper carbon tax rates are expressed in dollars per ton
of carbon contained in a fuel. To convert to dollars per ton of carbon dioxide
emitted, divide by 3.67.
16. There are two components to the tax. One component applies a charge
uniformly to all energy sources, except non-hydro renewables, according to their
energy content. Such a tax is known as a Btu tax in the United States. The
other component is a standard carbon tax, which is levied on fossil fuels accord-
ing to their carbon content. When both components are fully phased-in, the tax
as applied to oil would equal $10 per barrel, which is equivalent to $75 per ton
of carbon. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 14.
[Vol. 12
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Some European industries strongly oppose the tax, argu-
ing that it will damage their competitiveness, especially be-
cause European energy prices are already considerably
higher than United States prices. For this reason, the EC
Council agreed to the tax on a conditional basis, instead of
moving unilaterally as originally proposed. Implementation
of the tax has also been delayed by divisions between wealth-
ier and poorer nations concerning burden sharing and by
British concerns over the powers of the EC.
New energy taxes have also been under consideration at
the national level. As of early 1992, carbon-related energy
taxes had been introduced in Finland, Norway, Sweden, the
Netherlands, and Denmark. Sweden had also introduced sul-
fur- and nitrogen-based energy taxes. 17 In Japan, the Minis-
try of Finance and the Environment Agency have proposed a
carbon tax, although this is opposed by the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry.18
America's political debate over energy taxes has lagged
behind the consensus of other industrialized countries. There
is nonetheless an increasing recognition that energy taxes
have an important role to play in any comprehensive long-
term national strategy to combat global warming. This recog-
nition was a factor in President Clinton's decision to propose
the first broad-based national energy tax as part of his deficit
reduction plan of February 1993. The Clinton proposal was
adopted by the House, but subsequently replaced with a
smaller motor fuels tax following a Senate amendment.1 9
17. For a review of recent energy tax developments in industrialized coun-
tries, see INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTUES:
1991 REviEw (1992). See also INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, TAXING ENERGY:
WHY AND How (1993), for a discussion of the fiscal and non-fiscal rationales for
energy taxes.
18. Telephone Interview with Hirohiko Nishikubo, Environmental Attacha,
Japanese Embassy (July 1992).
19. For a summary of the Administration's original Btu tax proposal, see
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, U.S. CONGRESS, A VISION OF CHANGE FOR
AMERICA (1993). This proposal was subsequently modified by the Administra-
tion in response to objections by various industries and released by the Treas-
ury Department as legislative language on April 30, 1993. The House added a
few minor additional changes and introduced the bill in May 1993. H.R. 2141,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was passed by the House on May 27,
1994]
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The proposed tax applied to all fuels at a basic rate propor-
tional to their energy content as measured in British thermal
units (Btus).20 Oil-derived fuels were subject to an additional
surcharge. According to the Administration, the tax was
designed to serve four separate policy goals: deficit reduction,
environmental protection, national security, and energy
conservation.
The proposed Btu tax was considerably smaller than the
EC carbon/energy tax. The EC tax starts at a rate that is
roughly equivalent to the full Clinton tax and then increases
to more than three times this rate over seven years. Never-
theless, statements by EC spokesmen implied that the Clin-
ton tax would have gone a long way towards satisfying the
EC's conditionality requirement.21 It is likely, therefore, that
the Btu tax could have been introduced without United
States industry suffering any erosion in the energy price ad-
vantage that it enjoys over European competitors. Unfortu-
nately, the Administration failed to grasp this opportunity to
address industry competitiveness concerns and thereby an-
swer critics of its tax proposal.
In formulating the budget plan, the Administration con-
sidered a carbon tax but judged it inconsistent with the Presi-
dent's theme of deficit reduction through shared sacrifice.
Compared to the Btu tax, a carbon tax would have imposed a
higher burden on coal-producing and -consuming regions and
1993 as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. H.R. 2264, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). The Senate then passed its version of the bill deleting the Btu tax
and replacing it with a 4.3 cent per gallon motor fuels tax on June 25, 1993. S.
1134, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The conference version of the bill adopted
the Senate amendment and passed the House on August 5 by a 218-216 vote
and the Senate on August 6, 1993, by a 50-50 vote, with Vice President Al Gore
casting the deciding vote. H.R. 2264, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20. In the case of electricity produced by nuclear fission or hydropower, the
average Btu rate per kilowatt-hour for fossil-fired power plants was applied to
calculate the tax rate.
21. See, e.g., March Events Mark Beginning of Critical Period for EC Tax,
ENERGY EcoNoMIcs & CLIMATE CHANGE, Mar. 1993 (discussing talks between
president of the EC energy ministers and United States Secretary of Energy).
[Vol. 12
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a lower burden on regions with abundant hydropower. 22 The
proposed Btu tax, however, did incorporate a key feature of a
carbon tax: a zero tax rate for non-hydro renewable energy
production. It also favored natural gas over coal for new elec-
tricity generation, because of the relatively higher efficiency
of advanced gas-fired units.
Prior to the Btu tax debate, carbon tax proposals were
beginning to emerge as serious contenders for consideration
at the national level. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
released a major carbon tax study in 199023 and subsequently
included a carbon tax option in its annual report to Congress
on options for reducing the deficit.24 In February 1991, Rep-
resentative Pete Stark (D-CA), a senior member of the House
Ways and Means Committee, introduced legislation for a $18
per ton tax to be phased in over five years.25
Ideally, a national carbon tax whose primary purpose is
to combat global warming would be set at a rate that can
achieve society's emission reduction goals. Scientists have
concluded that a 60% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is
required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations at present
day levels. 26 To date governments have adopted more modest
short-term goals. President Clinton's commitment is'to re-
turn total United States greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels by the end of the century.27 Many OECD countries
22. Nevertheless, regional factors, including the opposition of Democratic
senators from oil-producing states, played a major role in the demise of the Btu
tax proposal.
23. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, CARBON CHANGES AS A
RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING: THE EFFECTS OF TAXING FossIL FUELS (1990).
24. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, REDUCING THE DEFI-
crr: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 343 (1992).
25. H.R. 1086, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE IPCC ScIENTiFuc ASSESSMENT (1990).
27. Under the Clinton Administration's Climate Change Action Plan,
United States carbon dioxide emissions, not including sinks, are expected to
increase by 3% between 1990 and 2000. This increase is to be offset by reduc-
tions in emissions of other greenhouse gases, especially methane, and by tree
planting. The total greenhouse gas emission level is calculated by multiplying
emissions levels for individual gases by a weighting factor, known as the "global
warming potential," which reflects the relative potency of each gas. Clinton,
supra note 7.
1994]
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have adopted more ambitious targets for the year 2000 that
apply specifically to carbon dioxide.28
Numerous econometric modelling studies which consider
the relationships between aggregate consumption of fossil fu-
els and other economic variables have examined the link be-
tween tax rates and emission levels. The studies generally
suggest that a tax of around $100 per ton of carbon is needed
to reduce United States emissions early next century by 30 to
40% from the levels expected under a business-as-usual sce-
nario.29 However, engineering technology assessments which
examine available efficiency improvements in particular tech-
nical applications have found that technologies are available
to achieve significant emission reductions at a low and even
negative cost.30 This implies that if markets worked per-
fectly, a lower or even zero tax rate would be sufficient to sta-
bilize emissions.
Economic models alone cannot determine the correct tax
rate for a given emission reduction goal for at least two rea-
sons. First, energy markets are highly imperfect. Numerous
barriers inhibit the adoption of cost-effective energy efficiency
and renewable technologies that would reduce carbon dioxide
emissions. A carbon tax should be part of a broader array of
policies that address the market failures as well as the policy
28. The Framework Convention on Climate Change includes ambiguous
language on the emission reductions required of developed countries by the
year 2000. Many OECD countries sought a firm commitment to stabilize CO 2
emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, but this was opposed by the Bush Administra-
tion. Nevertheless, the language eventually adopted can be read to require de-
veloped countries to return emissions of CO2 (not including sinks), and
separately those of other greenhouse gases, to 1990 levels by 2000. The Con-
vention does not include specific commitments for post-2000 emission reduc-
tions. However, for the ultimate objective of the Convention in relation to
atmospheric concentrations to be achieved, substantial reductions in developed
country emissions post-2000 will be required. See D. Bodansky, The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J.
INT'L L. 451 (1993) for a detailed discussion of the provisions of the convention.
29. William D. Nordhaus, The Cost of Slowing Climate Change: A Survey,
12 ENERGY J. 37 (1991).
30. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GREENHOUSE WARMING (1992).
[Vol. 12
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and institutional biases underlying these barriers. 31 The ef-
fectiveness of a tax will depend on the overall combination of
policies. For example, the price impact of the tax could be
amplified by using revenues to fund alternative technologies
and energy-efficient infrastructure. Indeed, one study found
that a significantly lower tax rate is required to achieve emis-
sions reductions if the revenues are dedicated to carbon
abatement measures as opposed to general revenues.3 2
Second, economic models are by nature backward look-
ing, relying on data describing how the economy functioned
in the past. They make little allowance for technological in-
novation that affects the cost of carbon abatement technolo-
gies, or for shifts in consumer preferences due to changing
lifestyles or values. Environmental policies commonly stimu-
late innovation that reduces the cost of achieving their stated
goals. Reductions in ozone depleting emissions, for example,
have proven to be far less expensive than was predicted only
a few years ago. A carbon tax enacted as part of a suite of
policies aimed at improving national energy efficiency, fuel
switching, and renewable energy technologies is likely to be
far more effective in meeting environmental and energy se-
curity goals and less burdensome to industry and consumers
than a tax enacted as a stand-alone policy.
In practice, any serious discussion of carbon tax propos-
als will involve multiple policy goals, as was the case with the
proposed Btu tax. Since a carbon tax can raise sufficient rev-
enues to affect the overall shape of government budgets, fiscal
considerations are likely to be a dominant factor. The Con-
gressional Budget Office estimates that a national carbon tax
of $70 per ton would raise net revenues of $72.5 billion per
annum.33 Carbon tax rates are, therefore, likely to reflect fis-
31. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTs ET AL., AMERICAcs ENERGY CHOIcES:
INVESTING IN A STRONG ECONOMY AND A CLEAN ENVmONMENT - ExEcUrrvE Sum-
MARY (1991).
32. NEw YoRx STATE ENERGY OFFICE ET AL., DRAFT NEW YORK STATE EN-
ERGY PLAN: 1991 BIENNIAL UPDATE - IssuE 9 ENERGY/ENVIRONMENTAL TAXEs
(1991).
33. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, REDUCING THE DEFI-
crr: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONs 343 (1992). The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that a $120 per ton carbon tax (1993 dollars) phased in over ten
1994]
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cal priorities as well as the judgments of decision makers
about environmental and other goals. Indeed, as both the
European and American experience suggests, the basic car-
bon tax design is likely to be modified to serve goals other
than combatting global warming, such as applying the tax to
nuclear energy or imposing a higher rate on oil.
Analysts have had little to say about how to design car-
bon taxes or how to set their rates to serve multiple policy
goals. Recent discussions have focussed on the potential uses
for carbon tax revenues. Several analysts have proposed a
"tax shifting" strategy, whereby such revenues are used to re-
duce existing taxes on capital and labor that retard invest-
ment and employment growth.3 4  Ex-Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker and former Council of Economic Ad-
visors Chairman Martin Feldstein suggest using a carbon tax
to reduce the federal deficit.35 This was also the main pur-
pose of the Btu tax. A third possible use for carbon tax reve-
nues is to finance public investment in energy efficient
transportation infrastructure and environmental technolo-
gies. Such investment has been proposed by some economists
to help revive growth and address longer term structural
problems in the United States economy,36 a position also em-
braced by President Clinton during the 1992 election
campaign.
years from 1993 would raise nearly $207 billion in revenues from 1993 through
1997, when the tax would be $70 per ton (1993 dollars). Id. Revenue estimates
are net of reduced income and payroll tax revenues.
34. See, e.g., ROBERT SHACsIErON Er AL., U.S. ENVONmENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THE EFFICIENCY VALUE OF CARBON TAX REVENUES (1992); ROGER C.
DowER & MARY BETH ZnmmRmAN, WORLD RESOURCES INSTrrUTE, THE RiGHT
CLIMATE FOR CARBON TAXEs: CREATING THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO PROTECT
THE ATMosPHERE (Aug. 1992).
35. Interview with Paul Volcker, Charlie Rose Show (PBS television broad-
cast, June 22, 1992); Martin Feldstein, The Case for a World Carbon Tax, WALL
ST. J., June 4, 1992, at A8.
36. See, e.g., ROBERT KuTnNER, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE SLOW
GROWTH TRAP AND THE PUBLIC INvESTMENT CURE (1992).
[Vol. 12
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III. Carbon Taxes at the State Level
Regardless of federal action, there are many good rea-
sons for states to consider levying modest carbon taxes. Such
taxes could serve state fiscal and environmental goals. More-
over, their introduction would help build momentum for a na-
tional shift towards carbon and other pollution taxes by
providing policy makers with practical experience and famil-
iarizing the body politic with the concept. State initiatives
would also avoid the difficult inter-regional politics of the Btu
tax debate.
State and local governments already impose various
taxes on energy consumption including motor fuel, utility,
sales, and other energy taxes. Increases in such taxes have
been on many states' agendas in recent years due to budget-
ary problems. However, unlike a carbon tax, none of these
taxes discriminate between clean and dirty fuels.
State carbon taxes are not precluded by the possible fu-
ture introduction of a federal carbon tax. Gasoline taxes pro-
vide a model of an energy excise base split between state and
federal use. State severance taxes on coal have also been par-
alleled by federal excises to support the Black Lung Trust
Fund.37 Finally, federal energy taxes of a similar magnitude
to the Clinton Btu tax would not suffice to achieve needed
reductions in carbon emissions in the near future. In this
context, state carbon taxes retain a critical role in environ-
mental management. Indeed, in some ways a national car-
bon tax improves the desirability of a state carbon tax.
Assuring compliance is a constant problem with all excise
taxes, and recent years have shown the value of state-federal
cooperation in assuring compliance with gasoline taxes.
State-federal agreements are likely to bear similar fruits in
the context of the system of energy excises which constitute a
carbon tax.
The case for state carbon taxes would also be strong if
the Administration and Congress decided to revisit the idea
37. The Black Lung Trust Fund was created by the Black Lung Benefits Act
of 1972 to benefit coal miners and surviving dependents of coal miners disabled
due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1994]
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of a relatively low Btu or ad valorem tax instead of a carbon
tax. These taxes are less effective at stimulating reductions
in emissions of carbon dioxide and other air pollutants. By
adopting carbon taxes, states could keep the energy tax de-
bate focused on environmental objectives and perhaps lay the
groundwork for a federal carbon tax.
A carbon tax as high as some of those being proposed at
the national level could cause significant interstate price dif-
ferences and damaging economic impacts unless a state
adopts compensating reductions in other taxes or a strong
system of border adjustments. 38 But even without such ad-
justments, more modest carbon taxes - perhaps as high as
$15 per ton - will be an attractive environmental and fiscal
option in some states. Twenty-five states tax the gross re-
ceipts of electric utilities at rates ranging from less than 1%
to nearly 10%. Of these states, fourteen also impose a sales
tax on at least some categories of electricity sales.3 9 A $10
per ton carbon tax on a utility with national average fuel mix
and electricity prices would mean a price increase of 2.4% for
residential customers and 4.0% for industrial customers.
These increases are within the range of existing taxes. The
$10 per ton carbon tax translates into 2.7 cents per gallon on
gasoline, which would represent only a small addition to ex-
isting state motor fuels taxes. 40
IV. Fiscal Policy Issues
As is true at the federal level, fiscal considerations will
influence whether states adopt carbon taxes. There are three
broad strategies for using state carbon tax revenues:
38. See infra sections VI.B. - VI.D.
39. JOE W. LOPER, ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION:
ENERGY POLicY BY ACCIDENT (June 1994). Of these twenty-five states, several
levy a gross receipts tax in lieu of corporation or property taxes. Some states
have local gross receipts (e.g., Illinois) or energy taxes (e.g., Maryland) in addi-
tion to a state tax. Of the states with no gross receipts tax, twenty-two impose a
sales tax on some or all electricity sales. Id.
40. Id. Motor fuels taxes are levied by every state. According to data com-
piled by the Federation of Tax Administrators, as of January 1, 1993 the me-
dian state gasoline tax was eighteen cents. The high was twenty-eight cents
and the low five cents. Id.
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" Providing revenues for state general funds and trans-
portation trust funds;
* Providing dedicated revenues for carbon abatement ini-
tiatives and air quality programs;
* Replacing existing state energy taxes with a tax that
sends a stronger environmental signal.
In recent years state finances have been under considera-
ble pressure. States were forced by a combination of factors
to enact record revenue increases for fiscal years 1991 and
1992.41 Faced with severe budget crises and the unpopular-
ity of conventional revenue sources, like income and sales
taxes, many states searched for new revenue sources. This
led Maryland, for example, to consider a state carbon tax dur-
ing the 1992 legislative session.42
State finances have improved somewhat in the past year,
partly because of the revenue increases and expenditure cuts
enacted in 1990 and 1991, and partly due to the slow im-
provement in the economy. New taxes and fees enacted for
fiscal year 1994 in the fifty states totalled $3 billion, com-
pared to a high of $15 billion for 1992.43 The economic recov-
ery, however, has been highly uneven, with slow growth
continuing to affect state finances in the northeast and far
west. Moreover, other pressures on state budgets have not
receded, including rapid growth in Medicaid expenditures, in-
creasing demand for state services such as corrections, and
cutbacks in federal spending. The finances of many states re-
main fragile. Fourteen states project end-of-year balances for
41. These increases were enacted in the 1990 and 1991 legislative sessions.
The net revenue increase for the fifty states totalled $10.3 billion in fiscal year
(FY) 1991 and $15.0 billion in FY 1992. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N AND NA-
TIONAL ASS'N OF STATE BUDGEr OFFiFws, THE FISCAL SuRVEY OF STATES (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 FIscAL SURVEY].
42. See infra section VIIA.
43. 1993 FIscAL SuRvny, supra note 41. Twenty-nine states enacted net
revenue increases and nine states enacted net revenue decreases for fiscal year
1994. Of the twenty-nine states that enacted net revenue increases, nine in-
creased sales tax revenues, nine increased personal income taxes, and twelve
increased corporate income taxes. Seven states increased motor fuels taxes by
amounts varying from one to six cents per gallon. Louisiana extended its sales
tax to utilities, and New Mexico and West Virginia increased fuel severance
taxes. Id.
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fiscal year 1994 of less than 1% of expenditures, leaving them
vulnerable to continued recession and other contingencies.4
Despite the turnaround in the economy, some states will
be forced to consider new revenue measures in the next few
years. First, some states may have to increase revenues to
overcome immediate budget shortfalls. Second, many states
are conducting strategic reviews of government functions and
revenues to address the long-term imbalance between reve-
nue and expenditure growth. There may be an openness to
new ideas in states where additional revenues are needed
and resistance is high to increases in conventional taxes. A
carbon tax will be an attractive option in states where energy
is lightly taxed and where energy taxes have not been re-
cently increased. A carbon tax is more broadly based, and
raises more revenue at a given tax rate, than most existing
state energy taxes.45 A carbon tax should be especially at-
tractive in states that depend on out-of-state fossil fuel sup-
plies and could benefit from redirecting private spending to
in-state efficiency measures.
There are two other trends in state fiscal policy that
could affect the prospects for state carbon taxes. First, states
are increasingly turning to environmental taxes and fees for
the specific purpose of funding environmental programs. 46
The largest increase in state taxes for fiscal 1993 was in mis-
cellaneous taxes and fees ($1.3 billion), including environ-
mental charges. 47 Although the total increase in this
category for 1994 was lower ($361 million), eight states intro-
duced additional environmental charges. 4
At the very time that state budgets are under pressure,
federal monies are not increasing with the growth of state
and local responsibilities under federal environmental man-
44. Id.
45. See infra section VIIJA.
46. EVELYN SHILs, NATIONAL GovERNoRs' ASS'N, FUNDING ENvIRONMEN-
TAL PROGRAMS: AN EXAmNATION OF ALTERNATrvES (1989).
47. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' Ass'N & NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OF-
FICERS, THE FiscAL SURVEY OF STATES (1992) [hereinafter 1992 FIScAL SURVEY].
48. 1993 FISCAL SURVEY, supra note 41.
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dates.49 A 1990 United States Environmental Protection
Agency report estimates that the costs incurred by local gov-
ernments nationwide in complying with the agency's various
environmental mandates will increase from $19.19 billion in
1987 to $32.54 billion in 2000, while state government costs
are estimated to increase from $2.99 billion to $4.44 billion.50
The 1990 amendments to the federal Clean Air Act, for exam-
ple, present states and localities not only with increased ad-
ministrative responsibilities, but also with the need to make
new investments in areas such as mass transit to achieve
compliance with air quality standards and avoid losing fed-
eral highway funds.5 ' A National Association of Counties
study estimates that the cost to counties of implementing the
Clean Air Act over the next five years (1994-98) will be $2.7
billion.52 The Clean Air Act specifically authorizes states to
include pollution taxes and other economic incentives in the
state implementation plans mandated by the Act.53 A carbon
tax can raise sufficient revenues to fund both clean air pro-
grams and investments in infrastructure and technologies
that reduce emissions of criteria pollutants and carbon
dioxide.
The second trend is the use of health-related taxes to fi-
nance health-related expenditures. For example, fifteen
states enacted cigarette and tobacco tax increases for fiscal
1994 with a total revenue gain of $634 million.54 President
Clinton is also proposing higher tobacco taxes to help finance
his health care reforms. States might consider taxing pollu-
tant. that are linked to health damages as a way of financing
49. MARYLAND DEP'T OF FISCAL SERVICES, JOINT STUDY GROUP ON REvE_
NUES: FINAL REPORT (1991).
50. This covers all of EPA's mandates including air, radiation, water, land,
and chemical pollution control. Estimates are in 1986 dollars. U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECnON AGENCY, ENVIRONmENTAL INVEsTMENTS - THE Cosr OF A
CLEAN ENvONMENT: A SUMMARY 2-5 (1990).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
52. NATIONAL ASS'N OF CouNTIEs, THE BURDEN OF UNFUNDED MANDATES: A
SURVEY OF THE IMPACT OF UNFUNDED MANDATES ON AMERICA'S CouNTIEs 4
(1993).
53. J. Andrew Hoerner, New Clean Air Bill Directs States to Collect Envi-
ronmental Taxes?, 49 TAX NoTEs 944 (1990).
54. 1993 FISCAL SURVEY, supra note 41.
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growing health expenditures. As discussed below, a carbon
tax could serve as a proxy for a general air pollution tax.
States will need to consider the stability of carbon tax
revenues in the context of their medium- to long-range fiscal
planning. At the low rates discussed here, the immediate im-
pact of state carbon taxes on fuel consumption and expected
revenues is likely to be modest. If carbon taxes and other fed-
eral and state policies achieve their emission reduction goals,
revenue will not grow proportionally to the economy. How-
ever, for a phased-in tax, future increases in the tax rate
would more than counteract reduction. Inflation will erode
carbon tax revenues unless the tax rate is indexed to the con-
sumer price index or another relevant price index. Carbon
tax revenues will also be affected by business downturns;
whether they are impacted more or less than other state
taxes should be evident from historical fuel consumption
data.
V. Environmental and Energy Policy Issues
In most states, regional air quality looms larger as a pol-
icy concern than does global warming. Measures to reduce
emissions of carbon dioxide, however, also reduce emissions
of conventional pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides
and hydrocarbons. As Table I below illustrates, a carbon tax
is a reasonable proxy for a general air pollution tax on fuel
combustion, because emissions of carbon dioxide associated
with burning coal, oil and natural gas broadly correlate with
emissions of the other major pollutants.
Even so, carbon taxes at the rates likely to be adopted by
states will only send a modest price signal. For an electric
utility with a fuel mix of 90% coal and 10% natural gas, a $10
carbon tax means a price increase of 2.9 mills per kilowatt-
hour. By acquiring renewable resources to shift its fuel mix
to 80% coal, 10% gas, and 10% renewables, the utility would
reduce its tax to 2.6 mills per kilowatt-hour. A diversified
utility with a fuel mix of 50% renewables, hydro and nuclear,
30% natural gas, and 20% coal, which is today's average fuel
[Vol. 12
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mix in California, would pay just 1.2 mills per kilowatt-
hour.55
TABLE I. RELATIVE UTILITY EMISSION FACTORS FOR COAL,
REsmuAL OIL AND NATuRAL GAS STEAm PLANTS,
NORTH CENTRAL UNITED STATES
5 6
C02 S0 2  NO. CO VOC
Coal 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Residual Oil 81% 31% 35% 89% 180%
Natural Gas 56% 1% 25% 196% 46%
However, the effectiveness of using state carbon taxes as en-
vironmental and energy policy tools will not hinge just on the
strength of the price signals they send. First, to the extent
that revenues are used to fund clean air or carbon abatement
programs such as energy efficiency or tree planting, such
taxes will provide a direct environmental benefit. The New
York State Energy Office, for example, estimates that an $8
carbon tax, with revenues dedicated to carbon abatement
measures, could reduce New York's emissions of carbon diox-
ide to 5% below 1988 levels by the year 2008. 5 7
Second, perceptions could matter more than actual tax
rates. The medium- to long-term price effect of a modest
state carbon tax will be magnified if it is perceived to be part
of a national and international trend to address regional and
global environmental problems through taxes and related
policies. Investors will consider the possibility of future in-
55. This assumes average heat rates of 10,000 BTU/kwh for coal and 12,000
BTU/kwh for gas, and transmission and distribution losses of 5%. For the di-
versified utility, an average heat rate of 11,000 BTU/kwh is assumed for gas
units.
56. Except for CO emission factors, which vary somewhat, the relative
rankings are the same for the northeastern, southern, and western regions.
The ranking for VOC emissions in the south (100%, 80%, 82% for coal, oil, and
gas respectively) differs from other regions. Emission factors for residual oil
and natural gas plants are expressed as a percentage of the equivalent emission
factor for a coal plant. Current average utility emission factors (lb/MBtu) are
used. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS ET AL., supra note 31.
57. NEW YORK STATE ENERGY OFFICE, DRAFT NEW YORK STATE ENERGY
PLAN: 1991 BIENNIAL UPDATE - IssuE 9: ENERGY/ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES (1991).
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creases in the tax rate and the introduction of similar taxes in
other jurisdictions.
Third, introducing carbon taxes at the state level will
help build political momentum for a national carbon tax. The
political process inherently resists new ideas, especially in a
controversial area like taxation. Legislators understand the
politics of conventional taxes on income and consumption and
are reluctant to move into uncharted waters. Agencies know
how to administer existing taxes and to estimate the reve-
nues they will generate. Interest groups know where they
stand with familiar proposals. Breakthroughs in states
where the political environment is receptive to a carbon tax
will help overcome this political inertia at a national level. It
will also provide policy makers with practical experience in
designing and implementing a carbon tax.
States may choose to combine introduction of a small car-
bon tax with a policy on the regulatory risk associated with
global warming, including the possibility of a future national
carbon tax or emissions trading scheme. The California Pub-
lic Utilities Commission recently ordered that the state's in-
vestor-owned utilities should only undertake long-term
purchases of electric power or generation capacity with sig-
nificant carbon emissions if the supplier provides assurance
that it alone will bear the costs resulting from a carbon tax or
other carbon emission control strategy.58 In the absence of
such a policy these costs are likely to be passed on to
ratepayers. 59
State carbon taxes should not substitute for current ef-
forts of state regulatory commissions to account for air emis-
sions in electric utility planning. Such taxes are likely to be
lower than the externality values already ascribed just to car-
bon emissions by regulators in several states. State carbon
taxes should instead be regarded as an initial step towards
taxing pollution which has important advantages over the
regulatory approach. A carbon tax can be applied to all fuels
58. CALIFORN A PuBLIc UTILIrIEs ComM'N, No. 92-04-045 (Apr. 22, 1992).
59. For a discussion of allocation of risks associated with future regulation
of C02 emissions, see R. Cavanagh et al., Utilities and CO2 Emissions: Who
Bears the Risks of Future Regulation?, 1993 ELECTRICITY J. 64.
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and end use sectors, whereas the regulatory approach singles
out the utility sector. Taxes are therefore a better instru-
ment for achieving a given environmental outcome at the
least cost to society. Indeed, within the utility sector, the reg-
ulatory decisions based on environmental externalities often
only apply to marginal investments, missing other cost-effec-
tive emission reduction opportunities. 60 By changing fuel
prices, a carbon tax influences the operation of existing gen-
erating units as well as resource acquisition decisions.
VI. Tax Design and Administration
A. Defining the Tax Base
An ideal carbon tax would be a tax on the actual release
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Although a carbon tax
is usually referred to as a tax on fossil fuels, when defining
the tax base it is important to think of the tax as ultimately
targeted at emissions of carbon dioxide from fuel combustion.
There are two natural candidates for the base of a broad-
based carbon tax at the state level. The first is emissions
caused by energy which is consumed in the state, regardless
of whether goods produced with that energy are consumed in-
state or out-of-state. This will be referred to as a "carbon
emissions tax." Such a tax would include both fuels directly
consumed and used to produce electricity consumed in the
state. The second is emissions from energy sold to house-
holds in the state or used to produce goods consumed in the
state. This will be referred to as a "carbon consumption tax."
The two bases differ only with respect to the proper tax treat-
ment of goods other than fossil fuels and electricity which
cross state lines. If the tax base is energy used to produce
goods consumed in a state, then manufacturers of exported
goods should receive a credit for carbon taxes paid on energy
used to produce those goods, while importers of goods into the
state should pay a tax based on the energy used to produce
the imports. If the base is emissions from energy consumed
60. Clinton J. Andrews, The Marginality of Regulating Marginal Invest-
ments: Why We Need A Systemic Perspective on Environmental Externality
Adders, 20 ENmnGY Poucy 450 (1992).
1994]
21
26 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
in the state, neither imports nor exports would receive any
special treatment.
This article does not discuss a third possible base: fossil
fuels produced in the state. This base is more appropriate for
a federal tax than a state-level tax because it would unneces-
sarily parallel the existing severance tax system and inappro-
priately dissociate the burdens of the carbon tax from the
benefits of energy consumption. It would also impose more
severe distortions on interstate trade in fuels and electricity
than either of the other bases.
These two preferred bases pose quite different problems
in tax design. In broad outline, the carbon emissions tax is
easier to administer, but at higher tax rates it may create
burdens on energy-intensive industries which compete in na-
tional and international markets. However, as shown in sec-
tion VI.B, the burden on even the most energy intensive
industries is quite modest at tax rates in the range likely to
be considered by states. Even these modest burdens can be
offset, but the offsets may reduce the fairness of the tax or the
incentives it provides for fuel switching and energy efficiency.
In section VI.C, this paper discusses how to design offsets to
minimize the reduction in environmental incentives from the
tax while providing any desired level of protection from com-
petitive burdens. A carbon consumption tax would not re-
duce the competitiveness of a state's energy-intensive
industries, even if the tax were at much higher levels than
have usually been considered possible for a carbon tax at the
state level. Taxing the carbon emissions associated with im-
ports, however, is administratively far more difficult and may
create a constitutional question related to interstate com-
merce. Again, these problems can be ameliorated, but only if
the United States is willing to accept "rough-justice" solu-
tions. In section VI.D, the problems associated with adminis-
tering a carbon consumption tax are discussed. Section VI.E
shows that such a tax, if properly designed, would probably
be found constitutional. Finally, section VI.F considers ad-
ministrative issues in setting the point of taxation for various
fuels.
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A carbon consumption tax will raise more revenue if a
state's nonenergy imports are produced using more fossil fu-
els than its nonenergy exports. If the state's nonenergy ex-
ports are produced using more fossil fuel than its nonenergy
imports, a carbon emission tax will raise more revenue.
It is not clear which base is preferable in terms of the
underlying justification for a carbon tax. A carbon emissions
tax is more effective in reducing the local consumption of en-
ergy from fossil fuels, but high rates could drive more highly
energy-intensive industries out of the state without inducing
any net reduction in carbon emissions from those industries.
To the extent that the tax is motivated by the state's desire to
do its part in combatting global warming, a carbon consump-
tion tax would probably be preferable. On the other hand, to
the extent that a carbon tax is enacted as a proxy for a gen-
eral tax on air pollution from the combustion of fossil fuels, a
carbon emissions tax is preferable, because it would be more
effective in protecting environmental quality and health
within the state.
The carbon tax bill introduced in Maryland, discussed in
section VII.A below, was a carbon emissions tax. It is instruc-
tive to examine the treatment of electricity under the Mary-
land tax. Under the proposed bill, electricity sold by each
Maryland utility would be taxed at a fixed rate per kilowatt-
hour (Kwh) that depended on the implicit carbon content of
the electricity as measured by an annual determination of
that utility's fuel mix. The fuel used to generate power
purchased by the utility was treated as part of the utility's
fuel consumption, even if purchased out-of-state, while elec-
tricity sold out-of-state was not taxed. This mechanism is
consistent with a carbon emissions tax if electricity is re-
garded as a form of fossil fuel transport. If, on the other
hand, electricity is regarded as a good in its own right, then
electricity is treated as it should be under a carbon consump-
tion tax, and the Maryland bill would embody a hybrid emis-
sions/consumption tax. However, because of the close
competition between electricity and other fuels in a variety of
end-use applications, it is more appropriate to regard electric-
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ity as a form of energy transmission rather than as an in-
dependent good.
It is probable that regulations will be required to settle
further questions about accounting for interstate flows of
electricity to prevent utilities from gaming the system to re-
duce the carbon tax burden without reducing net carbon
emissions. Suppose an in-state utility subject to the carbon
tax buys power from an out-of-state utility not subject to the
tax. Assume the out-of-state utility has 50% coal-fired elec-
tricity and 50% nuclear power. The out-of-state utility enters
into a contract to sell power from its nuclear plant. Because
electricity is fungible, this may have no impact on the genera-
tion mix. The out-of-state utility is simply calling the power
it sells to the in-state utility nuclear power, while it labels the
electricity it sells to its own customers coal-generated power.
To avoid such gaming, purchases should be tied to the aver-
age fuel mix of the entire selling utility, or perhaps even to
the mix in some larger unit, such as the power pool to which
the utility belongs.
Another tax base question is whether the state wants to
include greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide or carbon
dioxide emissions from sources other than fossil fuels. Other
greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide, and certain
organic compounds. The primary nonfuel sources of carbon
dioxide are the manufacture of lime and portland cement and
the destruction of natural carbon sinks, particularly the
clearing of forest land. Although it may ultimately be desira-
ble to include a broader spectrum of greenhouse contributors
in a tax designed to discourage global warming, extensions of
the tax beyond fossil fuels raise complex issues of both sci-
ence and tax policy which have not yet been adequately stud-
ied. These extensions should therefore probably be delayed
until they are better understood.
B. Effects on State Competitiveness
A carbon tax could have a negative impact on the com-
petitiveness of fossil fuel-intensive industries. The extent of
this impact would depend on a variety of factors, the most
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important of which are the tax rate and the extent to which
the industry's market is national or international. Some en-
ergy-intensive industries, such as portland cement and brick
making, could bear substantial tax burdens without altering
their competitive position because shipping costs are so high
that the market is essentially local.
A modest carbon tax would not seriously reduce the com-
petitiveness of any industry. For instance, among manufac-
turing industries defined at the level of the two digit
standard industrial classification (SIC) code, none would see
cost increases from a $7.50 tax per ton of carbon that would
exceed half a percent of their total sales.61 A $7.50/ton car-
bon tax is lower than the Clinton tax proposal for all
industries. 62
Consideration of industries at the four digit SIC code
level would place the heaviest burden on the manufacture of
portland cement. The cement industry is not internationally
competitive and is only slightly competitive on the state level
because cement, relative to its value, is expensive to trans-
port. Aside from cement, only nitrogenous fertilizers and a
few primary metal industries such as aluminum and steel
would see price increases in excess of half a percent, and even
these would see increases of no more than 2%. Overall, the
competitive impact of a modest state-level carbon tax would
appear to be limited to only a handful of industries and would
be small even for those industries most affected. 63
It should be noted, however, that these carbon consump-
tion estimates are based on average efficiencies for the listed
industries and that the imputed carbon consumption from
electricity use is based on national averages for the genera-
tion mix. Low-efficiency plants within an industry might
bear significantly higher burdens, as might highly electricity-
intensive industries in areas of the country where most elec-
tricity is generated from coal. From an environmental per-
spective this is precisely what is desired - low-efficiency
61. See Appendix 2, column 6.
62. See Appendix 2, column 4 for estimates of the Clinton Btu/oil tax for
comparison.
63. See Appendix 2, column 6.
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plants will pay a higher tax in order to provide a suitable effi-
ciency incentive. The least efficient plants, however, would
also suffer a larger disadvantage in terms of interstate and
international competitiveness under a carbon tax.
Because competitive burdens of a modest tax are limited
to a few industries or products, border adjustments or other
policies to offset competitive impacts could likewise be limited
to those same industries and products. This greatly reduces
the administrative complexity and compliance burden of
those adjustments.
C. Offsetting Competitive Burdens: A Carbon Emissions
Tax
The draft carbon tax legislation considered by the Mary-
land House of Delegates in 1992 included a provision setting
a cap on carbon tax at $250,000 per enterprise in an effort to
limit the impact of the tax on the competitiveness of Mary-
land industries.64 This form of competitiveness offset has the
merit of administrative simplicity and precedent, having al-
ready been used to limit the burden of the state's small envi-
ronmental surcharge on electricity. However, this offset is
only one strength against a number of weaknesses.
First, a simple per-firm cap is poorly designed to assist
firms that need relief. It may help a company for which the
carbon tax is a very small fraction of total cost simply because
that company is very large. Conversely, it will provide no
assistance to a small but extremely energy-intensive firm for
which the tax might have a real impact on the price at which
the firm can sell its goods. Second, the cap eliminates all in-
centive to invest in energy efficiency or fuel switching for
those firms which anticipate a tax liability that substantially
exceeds the cap. These large polluters may be the very firms
that are most able to achieve reductions with a real impact on
overall environmental quality.
64. MARYLAND HOUSE OF DELEGATES, BRIEFING ON PROPOSED AIR POLLU-
TION TAX BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (Mar. 12,
1992)(on file with the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVmw).
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A better way of structuring the cap would be to offset the
tax burden for the highest-energy industries with a separate
tax credit. The credit would be equal to a small percentage of
sales or to a fixed rate per ton of output. In either case, the
rate would vary by industry in a systematic way to assure
that no industry bears an average burden in excess of some
specified small percentage of price, e.g., one percent. Compa-
nies would be fully taxed on the energy they consume, but the
credit would assure that the impact on output prices, and
hence on competitiveness, would be small. Such a credit
would reduce the average energy tax burden on a company
while retaining the marginal tax rate on energy at the same
level. This would have the advantage of controlling the im-
pact of an energy tax on the sale price of goods produced in
the state, thus eliminating the impact of energy taxes on the
competitiveness of in-state firms, while retaining the incen-
tive to pursue energy efficiency. The magnitude of the credit
would be based on the energy consumption of the industry
during some base period, for example, the three years prior to
enactment.65
65. As an example of how such a credit would be calculated for "Big Steel
Company," assume that the maximum tax rate set by a state is equal to 1% of
gross sales. Assume that the carbon tax rate equals $10 per ton of carbon, or
$6.05 per ton of coal.
In the base period Big Steel Co. has sales of $1,000,000 and purchases
3305.8 tons of coal. Big Steel would have paid $20,000 in carbon tax had the
tax been in place, or two percent of gross sales. The Excess Burden Percentage
is defined as the percentage of gross sales in the base year less the Maximum
Tax Rate. Here that is: 2% - 1% = 1%.
In year two, the first year after the new tax is enacted, Big Steel Co.
doubles its output to $2,000,000 without changing its efficiency, and so
purchases 6611.6 tons of coal, paying $40,000 in carbon taxes. Big Steel re-
ceives a credit equal to its gross sales times the Excess Burden Percentage, here
$2,000,000 x 1%, or $20,000. This results in a tax net of credit of $20,000,
which is one percent of gross sales, the Maximum Tax Rate.
In year three Big Steel installs a new high-efficiency furnace. It continues
to produce $2,000,000 in steel, but consumes only 4958.7 tons of coal, a 25 per-
cent reduction. Thus it pays only $30,000 in carbon tax. However, the firm is
still entitled to the same credit, $2,000,000 x 1%, or $20,000. Thus the net tax
falls to $10,000, reducing the effective rate by 50 percent to one-half of one per-
cent. Under an incremental carbon tax efficiency gains pay big tax dividends.
Note that if Big Steel cuts its production, say to $500,000, without improv-
ing efficiency, its credit is cut proportionally, to $500,000 x 1% = $5,000. The
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The impact of carbon taxes on output prices can be set to
a very low level without losing a great deal of revenue. For
instance, if the maximum increase in an industry's output
price were set at one-half of one percent, the credit would cost
only about one-tenth of the revenue from the tax. Only a few
industries - cement, aluminum, steel, nitrogenous fertilizer,
and perhaps chlorine - would require credits. The tax bur-
den on each industry with and without a credit is shown in
Appendix 2. Column 6 shows the burden of a $7.50 carbon
tax as a percentage of the value of shipments. This is how
much the price of an industry's product would increase if all
of the tax burden were passed on in the price of output. Col-
umns 7 through 13 show the total tax burden under caps set
at various percentages of value of sales. These revenue num-
bers should be compared to the numbers in column 3, which
shows the carbon tax revenue without a credit. Finally, the
credit rate for each industry can be calculated by subtracting
the maximum percentage of sales at the top of columns 7
through 13 from the actual percentage of sales shown in col-
umn 6. For example, the $7.50/ton carbon tax would be
1.11% of the value of shipments for the aluminum industry.
Thus a credit intended to cap the price increase from the tax
at halfa percent of sales would be 1.11 - 0.5 = 0.61% of sales.
An equivalent tax based on tonnage of aluminum instead of
sales could easily be calculated.
Such a credit would be easy for firms to comply with and
the state to administer. All states already require firms to
calculate and report their sales for purposes of sales, income,
gross receipts, and other state business taxes, so the addi-
tional compliance burden would be minimal. Moreover, the
auditing burden would also be minimal because firms would
have no incentive to cheat. A firm could only receive a larger
credit by reporting more sales. Additional sales, however,
would also result in increases in other business taxes which
would likely exceed the tax decrease from the credit. Thus,
the only way a firm can increase its tax savings from the
effective tax rate remains the same as if production were not cut. Efficiency
gains lower the firm's effective rate, but production cuts do not.
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credit is to improve its energy efficiency. Efficiency improve-
ments can yield substantial tax advantages under a percent-
age of sales capping credit.66 The carbon tax/capping credit
combination can therefore be an effective device for encourag-
ing energy conservation.
The credit mechanism is also an efficient device for off-
setting competitive burdens. It provides each industry with
the tax relief that is strictly proportional to the burden on
that industry. It focusses relief on those firms that need it,
regardless of size and other irrelevant distinctions. It also
sets a cap on the price increase caused by the tax which is the
same for all industries and so should be regarded as fair. The
credit discriminates only on the basis of variations in fossil
fuel intensity within each industry, rewarding firms which
consume fossil fuels efficiently or move to non-fossil energy
sources, and punishing firms with above-average levels of fos-
sil fuel use and emissions. It should be noted, however, that
fossil fuel-reliant firms which achieve substantial efficiency
gains can end up with very low effective energy tax rates
when the credit and the tax are considered together. This
may create a perception of unfairness if the environmental
purpose of the tax is not sufficiently well understood.67
D. Offsetting Competitive Burdens: A Carbon
Consumption Tax
Under an ideal carbon consumption tax, all imports
would be taxed on the carbon content of the fuel used to pro-
duce them, and all exports would receive a rebate of carbon
taxes associated with fuels used to produce those exports.
Practically speaking, such a comprehensive system of border
adjustments is neither necessary nor desirable. Only a small
66. See supra note 65.
67. All incremental taxes face certain problems, first and foremost of which
is the definition of the tax liability in the base period. Special rules are needed
for mergers, spin-offs and new firms. For a discussion of these rules, see Steven
R. Corrick & Martin A. Sullivan, An Incremental Investment Tax Credit: Can It
Deliver on Its Promise?, 58 TAx NoTEs 209 (1993), and J. Andrew Hoerner,
Cheap, Effective, or Fair - Pick Any Two to Design an ITC, 58 TAx NoTEs 221
(1993).
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proportion of all goods that move in interstate commerce have
an energy content high enough to justify the administrative
cost of a system of special compensating taxes on imports or
of export credits. The affected goods would be those produced
by the same industries which might suffer a competitive bur-
den under a carbon emissions tax as discussed above: ce-
ment, aluminum, steel, nitrogenous fertilizer and perhaps
chlorine.
Adjustments would take place on both exports and im-
ports. A rebate or credit on exports would be easy to adminis-
ter and would not create troublesome constitutional issues.
Most states already require companies which are engaged in
interstate commerce to distinguish in-state and out-of-state
sales as part of the process of allocating the firm's total in-
come between the states. A firm could be given a credit in an
amount equal to the carbon tax paid multiplied by the per-
centage of all sales which are out-of-state sales. For diversi-
fied firms, the credit would have to be calculated by product
line to avoid a situation where, for example, the tax liability
from in-state production of cement was not reduced as a re-
sult of out-of-state sale of software.
The more troubling issues arise on imports. When a
wholesaler of copper pipe or aluminum siding sells to an in-
state contractor, it is probable that neither party has any
idea of the nature or quantity of fuel used to produce the
goods sold. Moreover, many thousands of firms may be in-
volved in selling such goods over a state's borders. To be en-
forceable, a tax on carbon emissions embodied in imports
would have to be based on simple observable qualities of the
goods, or be easily calculable from those observable qualities.
The easiest way to construct such a tax would probably
be a per-pound or per-ton tax on the import of the most en-
ergy-intensive goods, such as cement, aluminum, steel, and
nitrogenous fertilizers, based on national or regional data on
carbon fuels used to create those goods. This would provide a
working solution to the problem of taxing imports that would
probably be adequate to offset the major economic distortions
of the tax and preserve the competitiveness of the state mar-
ket. However, it might raise constitutional interstate com-
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merce issues, because the tax on imports would not be
defined in the same way as the tax on in-state production.
E. Constitutional Issues
Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,68 a
state may place taxes on interstate commerce which comple-
ment the taxes that it places on its own commerce. These
taxes have the purpose and effect of equalizing the tax bur-
den on interstate and intra-state transactions. When exam-
ining this issue a court will consider a state's tax system as a
whole, and will not reject a tax which on its face applies only
to interstate commerce where the tax system, "taken in its
totality, is within the state's constitutional power."69 In Hen-
neford v. Silas Mason, the Supreme Court approved a Wash-
ington state use tax set at the same rate as the state's sales
tax, which included a credit against sales taxes previously
paid on goods in another state. The Court found that the pur-
pose and effect of the tax was to equalize the tax burden on
state and interstate commerce and not to discriminate
against interstate commerce. 70
A carbon emissions tax, which has no special treatment
of interstate trade except to tax imports of fuels and electric-
ity and to rebate the carbon tax paid on exported fuels, treats
fuels in the same way as existing sales and motor fuel excise
taxes do and is clearly allowed under Silas Mason. It is less
obvious, however, whether the equalizing tax which a carbon
consumption tax would impose on the carbon content embod-
ied in imported goods would survive a challenge under the
Commerce Clause. This is because the tax on imported goods
is calculated on a different base - embodied carbon - than
the tax on in-state production, which is imposed directly on
fossil fuels. However, it will be shown below that such a tax,
68. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce... among
the several States." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
69. Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577,584 (1937) (quoting Gregg Dye-
ing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 480 (1932)).
70. Id. at 581. See also, W. Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense
to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAx LAwYER 405 (1986).
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properly designed, meets the constitutional standard under
the Commerce Clause.
Prior to 1977, case law suggested that a state could not
place a tax on an out-of-state entity for the privilege of doing
business in the state.71 The Supreme Court rejected this
view in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,72 in which it
announced a four-prong test for the validity of a tax under
the Commerce Clause. Under the Complete Auto test, a tax is
valid where the transaction (1) has sufficient nexus to the
state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and (4) is reasonably related to
services provided by the state.73 Each of these factors will be
considered in turn.
1. Nexus
An activity is required to have a sufficiently close rela-
tionship with a state in order to bring it properly within the
reach of the state's sovereignty. There is clearly no nexus
problem with respect to taxing in-state sales or imposing
compensating use taxes on in-state use. Thus, there would
appear to be no nexus issue with taxing fuel-intensive goods
on import. Indeed, many states now impose their taxes on
gasoline and other fuels on the shipper or the first recipient
on import.
The issue would become somewhat more problematic if
the state attempted to impose its tax on out-of-state entities
shipping goods into the state. The Supreme Court has been
gradually relaxing the nexus requirements, and now recog-
nizes that a state has the authority to tax a firm as long as
the firm has at least one employee,74 or a representative in-
dependent contractor within the state. 75 However, this nexus
71. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318
(1977); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Illinois Cent.
R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
72. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
73. Id. at 279.
74. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
75. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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requirement is not satisfied if the firm's only contact with the
state is by mail.76
2. Apportionment
Income attributable to multistate operations must be
fairly apportioned in order to prevent multiple taxation.
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Blair77 held that Iowa could
allocate corporate income by a single-factor, the corporation's
in-state sales as a fraction of total sales, even though this al-
located more income to Iowa than the three-factor test (sales,
payroll and property) used by most states. The Supreme
Court found that:
states have wide latitude in the selection of apportionment
formulas and that a formula-produced assessment will
only be disturbed when the taxpayer has proved by "clear
and cogent evidence" that the income attributed to the
state is in fact "out of all appropriate proportion to the
business transacted... in that state" or has "led to a
grossly distorted result."78
Under a carbon emissions tax, the tax burden on fuel and
electricity consumption by a multi-state firm is apportioned
according to the proportion of energy from fossil fuels, includ-
ing carbon consumption embodied in electricity consumption
consumed in-state. Under a carbon consumption tax, the tax
burden on fuel consumption of a multi-state firm is appor-
tioned according to the proportion of sales of final goods in the
state. Given the wide latitude that the Supreme Court has
accorded states in their apportionment, it seems clear that
either of these systems would pass constitutional muster.
3. Discrimination
A state is not permitted to impose taxes which are in-
tended to discriminate against interstate commerce or which
have the effect of discriminating against interstate com-
76. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
77. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
78. Id. at 274.
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merce. The Commerce Clause's ban on discrimination is ob-
viously violated where there is direct evidence that a tax is
intended to discriminate, such as a tax imposed on out-of-
state entities which is not a complement to a tax of the same
magnitude on in-state entities,7 9 or a tax on both in-state and
out-of-state entities which includes credits or exclusions that
substantially exempt in-state entities from the tax.80 In
these cases, intent to discriminate can be inferred from the
nature and structure of the tax.
Although some scholars have argued that the dormant
Commerce Clause requires the invalidation of state legisla-
tion only when the discrimination against interstate com-
merce is intentional,8 1 it is clear that in the arena of taxation
the Supreme Court has gone further and has barred a class of
taxes which have the effect of placing additional burdens on
interstate commerce regardless of intent. Where the tax does
not discriminate against interstate commerce on its face or
where it is intended to complement a tax on intra-state com-
merce, the Court will examine the totality of the burdens im-
posed by the tax system and will conclude that the tax is
discriminatory only if the burden that the tax places on inter-
state commerce is so disproportionate to the burden on local
commerce as to bear unfairly on the former.82
Since 1983, the Supreme Court has adopted a second test
under the rubric of non-discrimination, that of "internal con-
sistency," which is also applied in apportionment cases.8 3
The Court defines a tax as internally consistent if two or
more states with an identical tax system would subject the
taxed interstate activity to multiple tax burdens. A state is
constitutionally permitted to use a tax system which in prac-
tice - given the actual tax systems of other states - places
additional burden on interstate commerce, provided that the
79. Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 457 U.S. 638, 643-44 (1984).
80. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
81. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 McH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).
82. Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537, 542 (1969);
Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
83. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983).
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formula is "internally consistent" such that there would be no
multiple taxation if every state used that formula. The Court
appears to believe that the evaluation of the internal consis-
tency of a tax, unlike the evaluation of the precise level of
burden that a tax imposes, is within its scope of review. As a
result, it has been willing to invalidate taxes which are not
internally consistent even where the additional burden
placed on interstate commerce by the tax is quite modest.84
A carbon consumption tax will most likely run afoul of
the discrimination prong of the Complete Auto test. The tax
facially discriminates against energy-intensive imports, but
is arguably a complementary tax to the in-state tax on fossil
fuels. Because the intent of the tax is to achieve equality, and
because a tax on the actual implicit carbon content of imports
would be difficult if not impossible to administer, the
Supreme Court is likely to accept the tax so long as in prac-
tice it does not place a substantial additional burden on out-
of-state companies relative to similarly situated in-state
companies.
So long as the tax rates on imported high-energy prod-
ucts are correctly set, out-of-state companies should, on the
average, bear the same tax burden as in-state companies.
However, a highly energy-efficient out-of-state company or an
electricity-intensive company from a state with more non-fos-
sil electricity production may bear an excessive burden com-
pared to an equally energy-efficient in-state company. In
order to assure that the tax is constitutionally valid with re-
spect to such companies, the state should create a mechanism
which allows an out-of-state company to calculate the actual
implicit carbon content of its product and the carbon tax that
would apply to the portion of its product shipped to the state.
In addition, the company would receive a rebate of any excess
of the tax collected on import and the tax due based on actual
fuel consumption.
84. Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (holding West Vir-
ginia's wholesale gross receipts tax unconstitutional); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v.
Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 240 (1987) (holding Washington's
manufacturing tax unconstitutional).
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Similarly, to avoid problems with the internal consis-
tency test, it would probably be wise to include a credit
against carbon taxes - taxes on fossil fuels set proportional
to their carbon content - paid in other states. No credit
should be granted for taxes on fossil fuels which are not car-
bon taxes, because such taxes would not necessarily produce
the environmental benefits of carbon taxes.
It is worth noting that for unit taxes such as carbon
taxes, unlike ad valorem taxes, the tax does not vary depend-
ing on the point in the chain of production at which it is im-
posed. A tax on coal levied per ton of carbon is of the same
dollar amount whether levied at the mine mouth, on combus-
tion, or at any intermediate point.85 Moreover, for unit taxes,
economic theory suggests that the incidence is the same
whether the tax is imposed on the buyer or the seller. A tax
on interstate commerce designed and intended to comple-
ment a tax on intrastate commerce violates the Commerce
Clause only if it places a palpably disproportionate burden on
interstate commerce.8 6 Because the point at which a carbon
tax is levied alters neither the level of burden nor the distri-
bution of the incidence of the tax, it should be possible to set
the point of taxation based on administrative convenience
without running afoul of the Commerce Clause.
4. Reasonable Relationship to State Services
The final prong of the Complete Auto test is whether the
tax is reasonably related to services provided by the state.
This test does not ask the courts to balance the tax rate
against the value of the services the state provides, but
rather asks if "the measure of the tax is reasonably related to
the taxpayer's activities or presence in the state." 7 The prin-
cipal remaining impact of the requirement that a tax be rea-
85. An ad valorem tax set at a fixed rate will impose a higher burden on
delivered coal than on coal at the mine mouth because of the increase in value
and price attendant on delivery.
86. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
87. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981) (up-
holding a severance tax on coal which was almost entirely borne by out-of-state
purchasers).
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sonably related to services would appear to be some stricture
against applying flat taxes equally to interstate and intra-
state commerce where state residents are likely to enjoy
greater benefits from the subject of the tax.88 This restriction
is not relevant to the carbon tax.
F. Point of Taxation
Economic theory suggests that the point in the chain of
distribution at which the carbon content of a fuel is taxed
does not affect the economic incidence of the tax. The point of
collection may be very important, however, in determining
how easy the tax is to administer and audit, and thus may
have an important direct impact on the compliance rate and
indirect impact on the tax revenue. Because a carbon tax is
essentially a broad-based tax on fossil fuels, it is important to
coordinate the carbon tax with the other energy taxes im-
posed by a state.
To simplify collection, it is commonly proposed that a na-
tional carbon tax be levied at the point fossil fuels enter the
economy, i.e., the mine mouth, wellhead, or dock.8 9 In most
cases, state carbon taxes will be collected in the same manner
and at the same time as the states' other taxes on the same
fuels. For instance, a state which now taxes gasoline on im-
port should probably impose the carbon tax on gasoline on
import. If the state taxes gasoline at the pump, it should im-
pose the carbon tax at the pump. The carbon tax can be
rolled into existing taxes without any need for additional ad-
ministrative procedures and without creating any additional
compliance burden.
It is important to examine the entire range of current en-
ergy taxes in a state and the state's pattern of fuel use in
determining how a carbon tax is collected. For instance, mo-
tor fuels sold to common carriers are taxed under a separate
system in most states. A state like Montana which consumes
only in-state coal could roll the coal portion of its carbon tax
into its severance charge, while a state that both produces
88. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
89. DowER & ZimnmRmA, supra note 34, at 5.
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and imports coal might wish to levy the tax on import and at
the mine mouth, or to levy the tax on consumption. For new
taxes, it normally makes sense to look for narrow points in
the distribution scheme, points where the number of taxpay-
ers and the possibilities of evasion are smallest.
The tax on electricity and gas might be levied on electric
and gas utilities, narrow points in the supply system at which
many states already collect taxes. Direct consumption of coal
should be taxed at a point appropriate to a state's supply and
use patterns. For electricity, the tax should vary with the
fuel mix of each utility. Accounting rules will be needed to
establish the fuel mix for utilities that participate in power-
sharing pools or purchase out-of-state power. The tax should
be designed to avoid double-taxation of such things as co-gen-
erated electricity. Federalism concerns suggest that a carbon
tax should also be designed to avoid taxing electricity and fos-
sil fuels which are exported from the state. As a matter of
fiscal policy, however, some states may choose to apply the
tax to exports of fuel or electricity. West Virginia, for in-
stance, currently applies its utility tax to electricity which is
sold outside the state as well as within the state.90 From the
perspective of selecting a base for an environmental tax
within a federal system, the decision to tax exported fuels or
electricity is best supported if the primary goal is to reduce
local environmental impacts from fossil fuel consumption
rather than from global warming.
A carbon tax differs from other fossil fuel excises in sev-
eral ways that may alter the point at which it is taxed or re-
quire additional administrative procedures. For example,
fossil fuels used as feedstocks rather than burned, such as oil
used in the manufacture of plastics, should be exempted from
tax. Often a taxpayer will use a fuel both for energy and for a
feedstock. The simplest way of dealing with this problem is
to create a refundable credit in the state's general business
tax for carbon tax paid on fuels used as feedstocks, which
90. "The measure of th[e] tax shall be the value of all the electric power
generated or produced in this state for sale, profit, or commercial use, regard-
less of the place of sale or the fact that transmission may be to points outside
this state." W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2m(b) (1994).
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would require taxpayers to maintain auditable records of
feedstock use. If the state imposes its tax on the fuel in ques-
tion at the point of sale to the final consumer, however, it
may be possible to exempt those who use the fuel only as a
feedstock, perhaps by creating a program of exemption certif-
icates for feedstock users. Even under a feedstock exemption
program it is important that the recipient of exempt fuel
maintain auditable records of exempt fuel use to forestall the
sort of illicit trade in untaxed fuel that has developed in the
kerosene industry.91
The second difference is that because the fundamental
rationale of a carbon tax suggests that the tax should be ap-
plied to the entire fossil fuel base, the tax should not include
many of the exemptions that some states have allowed
against other fossil fuel taxes. For instance, it is inappropri-
ate to exempt fuel used in farming, home heating oil, or fuels
used by state agencies, as many states have now done. This
may require that the tax be collected from different parties or
from sources who are unused to paying fossil fuel taxes. As
an example, dealers in home heating oil in a state which ex-
empts such oil from taxation would be brought into the excise
tax system if the tax is imposed on sales to the final con-
sumer. This may also create political opposition from groups
that have been accustomed to receiving preferential treat-
ment under existing taxes on fossil fuels.
The existence of a tax, even at a low level, which applies
to all fossil fuels may aid states in assuring compliance with
their existing taxes on fossil fuels. The Federal Highway Ad-
ministration estimated that 5% of gasoline taxes and about
25% of diesel fuel taxes were evaded in 1990, at a cost to
states of more than three billion dollars. 92 The higher level of
evasion on diesel fuel is largely a product of an extensive
trade in exempt fuels. A carbon tax which applies to all fuels
91. See FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADnmNISTRATION, REPORT No. FHWA-PL-92-028,
FUEL TAX EVASION: THE JOINT FEDERAIJSTATE MOTOR FUEL TAX COMPLIANCE
PRoJECT 89 (1992) for a discussion of evasion problems relating to fuel tax
exemptions.
92. Id.
1994]
39
44 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
consumed in a state would lead to more efficient accounting
for fuels and fewer opportunities to manipulate the system.
VII. Selected Cases
Four examples of possible state carbon taxes follow. The
first proposal, designed to raise general revenue, was consid-
ered by the Maryland state legislature during its 1992 ses-
sion. Two examples are taken from California: a proposal
put forward in the 1993 legislative session to introduce a car-
bon tax as an alternative to extending a temporary increase
in the sales tax, and a proposal developed by the Center for
Global Change for a small carbon tax to finance environmen-
tal technology development. The final example, from Minne-
sota, is also designed to raise revenue for environmental
purposes.
A. Maryland
Faced with a widening gap between projected state reve-
nues and expenditures, the Maryland General Assembly in
mid-1991 established a joint House-Senate study group to re-
view the state's revenue system. The group solicited ideas for
new environmental taxes. The environmental community ad-
vanced various proposals that would generate revenues for
state environmental programs, including a pesticides tax and
solid waste fees. Although these proposals attracted interest,
they failed to address the legislators' central concern of rais-
ing sufficient revenue to avoid deep spending cuts in general
programs.
Among the substantial revenue options proposed by the
legislature's fiscal staff were additional conventional energy
taxes, including a sales tax on residential fuels and an in-
crease in utility and electricity taxes.93 The governor also
proposed a five cent increase in the motor fuels tax. Unlike
these options, a carbon tax would discriminate between clean
and dirty fuels. It also raises more revenue at equivalent tax
rates because it is more broadly-based than the alternatives,
93. MARYLAND DEPT OF FISCAL SERVICES, JoINT STUDY GROUP ON REVE-
NUES: FINAL REPORT (1991).
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applying to all fossil fuels and all end use sectors. In re-
sponse to a request from several legislators, the Center for
Global Change developed a proposal for a carbon tax at $7.50
per ton.94 Table II compares the revenue, environmental,
and household impacts of this proposal and the alternative
energy tax increases. 95
TABLE II. STATE TAX PROPOSALS AFFECTING ENERGY USE, MARYLAND, MARCH 1992.
DIRECT
EsTmTED HOUSEHOLU FUELS/SEcToRs EzvmiENmanAL
TAX OPTION ANNUAL REVENuE hIPACT AFFEmCED BENEFITs
AM POLLUTION TAX • all fossil fuels , general energy
electricity from conservation
@ $7.50 per ton $200 million $45 to $55 /yr fossil fuels @ switching from
* all sectors dirty to clean
energy sources
@ $3.75 per ton $100 million $23 to $28/yr * promotes
renewables
SALES TAX ON $110 million $60 to $75/yr * electricity, • residential
RESIENTIAL natural gas, fuel energy
ENERGY USE oil & LPG conservation
(5%) * residential
sector only
RAISE UTILITY GROSS $116 million $15 to $35 /yr * electricity & * electrical
RECEIPTS TAX natural gas energy
(2% to 5%) a all sectors conservation
RAISE $18 million $4/yr • electricity only * electrical
ENVIRONMENTAL * all sectors energy
SURCHARGE ON conservation
ELECTRICITY • switching from
(0.147 to 0.5 mills electricity to gas
per kwh)
RAISE MOTOR FUELS $120 million $50/yr • gasoline & • motor fuels
TAX diesel only conservation
(18.5 to 23.5 cents * transportation
per gallon) only
94. On file with author at CGC, University of Maryland at College Park.
95. Estimates of air pollution and sales tax revenues from ENERGY INFO.
ADmIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUB. No. 0214, STATE ENERGY DATA REPORT
1992 (1994). Other revenue estimates from MARYLAND DEP'T OF FISCAL SERV-
ICES, supra note 93. Household impact, estimated by Center for Global Change,
represents average annual increase in household energy expenditures, includ-
ing gasoline but excluding price increases in non-energy goods. Ranges reflect
differences in average consumption and fuel mix between utilities.
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The carbon tax proposal was included among a long list
of revenue options submitted by the study group to the
General Assembly, but was called an air pollution tax to
emphasize its broader air quality benefits.9 6 Air pollution is
an important policy concern in Maryland because a large
proportion of the state's population lives in areas which do
not meet national air quality standards. For example,
Baltimore is the fourth worst city in the nation for smog.
A $7.50 carbon tax would raise around $200 million in
Maryland.97 Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix 3 show the share of
revenue raised by fuel type and end use sector. It translates
into 2.25 cents per gallon on gasoline, fuel oil and other
petroleum products, 1.2 cents per therm on natural gas, and
$5.30 per ton on coal. For electricity, the tax would be 1.2
mills per kilowatt hour for customers of the state's largest
utility, Baltimore Gas and Electric, which has a nuclear
plant. Customers of the remaining major utilities, which are
heavily coal-based, would be taxed 2 mills per kilowatt hour.
As Table III below shows, a $7.50 per ton carbon tax results
in price increases of approximately two percent for the fuels
and electricity used by households. It also shows that
substantially higher state and local energy taxes are already
levied in Maryland.98
96. On file with author at CGO, University of Maryland at College Park.
97. This is a first year estimate which assumes the tax has no impact on
fuel consumption or expected revenues. As discussed in the text, revenues will
decline as the tax and other policies affect demand. Estimate based on DOE
state energy consumption data for 1989. ENERGY IN'o. ADmIN., supra note 95.
98. Estimates based on data compiled by Center for Global Change. Prices
and tax rates are for residential customers. Prices include federal, state and
local taxes. State tax rate for electricity and gas includes a two percent utility
tax and a small per kilowatt-hour environmental surcharge. County taxes
vary; Prince George's County is included as an example of a high energy tax
county.
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/2
POLLUTION TAX FORUM
TABLE m. TAX RATE COMPARISON: PROPOSED Am POLLUION TAX
(AT $7.50 PER TON)
AND EXISrING ENERGY TAxEs IN MARYLAND, MARCH 1992
air pollution Prince George's
price (approx) tax rate state taxes County taxes
gasoline $1.15 $0.0225 $0.185
(per gallon) _ 
_ 
_ _ 
_ _
fuel oil (per gallon) $1.00 $0.0225 $0.0832
natural gas $0.60 $0.012 $0.012 (est) $0.0428
(per therm)
electricity $0.08 $0.0011 to $0.0020 $0.0017 (est) $0.0047
(per Kwh) __
For the average household, the tax would increase
expenditures for direct purchases of energy by around $50
per year, which includes about $23 for gasoline. An
additional indirect burden on households would arise from
the tax on businesses. But the carbon tax still compares
favorably with other tax options, which tend to fall more
heavily on households than businesses. 99
In January 1992, a bill was introduced into the state
Senate by Senate Majority Leader Charles Blount and Gerald
Winegrad, the Chairman of the Environment Subcommittee,
Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee, for
an air pollution tax at $3.75 per ton.100 This bill earmarked
$21 million in revenues for low income weatherization and
energy assistance programs, which had suffered federal
cutbacks in recent years, and measures to improve energy
efficiency in state buildings. 101 The bill was the product of an
alliance between representatives interested in raising
revenue and serving environmental and social justice
objectives. The bill went to hearings of the Senate Budget
and Taxation Committee.
Negotiations for a budget deal were concurrently taking
place in the House of Delegates. The House Ways and Means
Committee subsequently circulated a draft bill for a carbon
tax at $7.50 per ton and held hearings on the proposal. 0 2
99. See Table ].
100. 1992 Md. S.B. 665.
101. Id.
102. MARYLAN HousE OF DELEGATES, supra note 64.
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This version was directed more clearly at raising revenues
and did not include the specific dedications of the Senate bill.
It attracted interest from a wide spectrum of delegates,
including supporters of broad-based indirect taxes.
Several important features were included in both
proposals:10 3
* the tax would be collected from petroleum product dis-
tributors, electric and natural gas utilities and indus-
trial consumers of coal, thereby taking advantage of
existing tax collection systems and simplifying
administration;
* revenues collected from motor fuels would go to the
state's transportation trust fund but could only be
spent on public transit projects and measures to reduce
vehicle use;
* the amount of tax payable by an individual manufac-
turer would be capped to protect energy intensive in-
dustries facing interstate and international competitive
pressures.
A wide range of environmental groups supported the tax
idea at Senate and House hearings. 10 4 Most environmental
groups supported adding the Senate's specific dedications to
the House version and dedicating additional revenues to
clean air programs currently financed through the state's
general fund.
The tax was strongly opposed at the hearings by electric
and gas utilities and large industrial energy consumers who
argued that the additional tax burden would damage the
state's economy.10 5 Although they participated in the utility-
led business panels at both hearings, legislators saw two in-
terest groups as tacit supporters of the proposal: service sta-
tion owners who preferred the air pollution tax (at 2.25 cents
per gallon) to a proposed five cent increase in the motor fuels
103. See id.
104. On file with author at CGC, University of Maryland at College Park.
105. On file with author at CGC, University of Maryland at College Park.
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tax, and developers of co-generation projects associated with
the state's chemical industry.1 0 6
The Center for Global Change responded to utility criti-
cism by pointing to Maryland's relatively low rate of taxes on
electricity, natural gas, and business compared with sur-
rounding states, as shown in Table IV.1o7 Although the con-
cerns of energy intensive industries such as steel, aluminum
and paper mills that compete internationally were addressed
with the cap on the amount of tax payable, they remained
opposed.
TABLE IV. STATE BusmNss AND ENERGY TAXES IN THE
Mm-AT.mAri REGION, 1991
MD DE DC NJ PA VA WV
Tax rate on corporate
income 7% 8.7% 15% 9.4% 12.25% 6% 9.15%
Motor Fuels Tax 18.5% 19% 18% 10.5% 10.4% 17.5% 20.4%
Electric & gas utility
receipts tax 2% 4.3% 9.7% 5.6% 5% 2% 4%
% of revenues from
business taxes 3.6% 19.1% 7.0% 9.6% 8.1% 3.7% 6.4%
The air pollution tax proposal remained an option until
the final days of the legislative session when a budget deal
was sealed. Legislators finally opted for changes to the
income and sales tax to balance the state's general fund and
up to a five cent increase in the motor fuels tax for the
transportation fund.108 Nonetheless, many observers were
surprised how far such a major new tax idea had progressed
in just one year.
106. On file with author at CGC, University of Maryland at College Park.
107. Data compiled by Center for Global Change from state agency sources.
Delaware exempts residential sales from the utility tax; the West Virginia util-
ity tax is 4.3% for gas and 2% for sales to large electricity consumers. Revenue
share data is for FY 1989.
108. See Acts of 1992, ch. 3, § 9, MD. CODE ANN. TAx-GEN. § 9-305(2) (1994).
The 1992 Amendments increased the tax on four categories of motor fuels. The
greatest increase, five cents per gallon, was in the second category of "gasoline
other than aviation gasoline." Id.
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B. California
1. Reducing the Sales Tax
For several years the global recession and defense cut-
backs have depressed the California economy and severely
strained the state's finances. In 1992 and 1993 the California
legislature faced extremely difficult revenue and expenditure
choices in balancing the state's budget. A major issue of con-
cern during the 1993 legislative session was the disposition of
a one-half percent portion of the state's sales and use tax that
was due to expire on June 30, 1993. Expiration would have
resulted in an annual revenue loss of $1.56 billion by fiscal
year 1994-95.109 At the start of the session, many legislators
supported extending the tax to avoid further cutbacks in
state services, but Governor Wilson opposed such an
extension.110
Assemblyman Tom Bates introduced alternative legisla-
tion to replace the half percent increment with a $3 per ton
carbon tax on fossil fuels consumed in the state, which was
later amended to include a schedule of annual increases so as
to reach a $21 per ton carbon tax by the year 2003.111 The
Bates proposal was estimated to raise $1.47 billion per an-
num, which was to be directed into the state's General Fund.
109. 1993 Cal. A.B. 1725 (as amended May 5, 1993). See also Cal. Assembly
Committee on Revenue and Taxation, Memorandum on A.B. 1725 (May 10,
1993) (on file with authors) [hereinafter A-B. 1725 Memorandum].
110. Interview with Chris Calwell, Natural Resources Defense Council, in
San Francisco, Cal. (1993).
111. A.B. 1725 Memorandum, supra note 109. The actual tax rate in the bill
is $3 per ton of CO2 emitted and the base includes both the direct emissions
from fuel combustion and the indirect emissions from other stages of the fuel
cycle, such as extraction, refining, and transportation. Such a tax raises more
revenue than an equivalent carbon tax assessed solely on fuel consumption and
arguably provides a better environmental signal. On a statewide basis the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission (CEC) estimated direct and indirect emissions of
carbon dioxide associated with California's energy consumption for the year
1988. CAuFORNIA ENERGY CoMM'N, 2 GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: POTENTIAL IM-
PACTS AND PoLIcY RECOMmENDATIONS (1991). Assessing a tax on indirect emis-
sions, however, which can vary considerably among different sources of the
same fuel, may present administrative and fairness problems. The bill directed
the CEC to estimate direct and indirect emissions and set fuel-specific tax
rates.
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Like the Maryland proposal, the tax applied to imported elec-
tricity,11 2 and its rate was to be adjusted annually in line
with the Consumer Price Index."13 Unlike the Maryland pro-
posal, the bill did not provide offsets for energy-intensive in-
dustries. However, an exemption for households up to a
baseline level of electric and gas consumption was
proposed."34
The Bates proposal received strong support from the en-
vironmental community and from some segments of business,
including the Ford Motor Company.115 However, it was op-
posed by the California Manufacturers Association, electric
and gas utilities, and other energy industry interests.116 The
bill went to a hearing in the Assembly Revenue and Taxation
Committee at which it was suspended, pending further dis-
cussions on the state budget.'1 7 A deal was ultimately
reached between the Governor and the legislature that bal-
anced the budget by diverting certain local property tax reve-
112. Approximately 20 percent of the electricity consumed in California is
generated at coal-fired power plants located outside the state. CALFoRNIA EN-
ERGY COmf'N, supra note 111.
113. Assemblyman Bates started with a more ambitious proposal. When first
considering this issue, Bates favored a carbon tax starting at $11 per ton in
1994 and increasing annually to reach $77 per ton in 2003. A.B. 1725 Memoran-
dum, supra note 109. Under this scheme the rate of the sales and use tax would
be adjusted downward each year with a revenue loss equal to the revenue gain
from the carbon tax. Id.
114. See id. Assemblyman Bates introduced the baseline exemption in the
May 13, 1993 version of the bill. A baseline exemption would reduce revenues
from the tax unless the rate on above-baseline use was increased to make up
the shortfall.
115. Interview with Chris Calwell, Natural Resources Defense Council, in
San Francisco, Cal. (1993); Letter from Marilyn R. Riley, Assistant Regional
Manager Governmental Affairs, Ford Motor Company, to Tom Bates, California
Assembly Member (Apr. 19, 1993)(on file with the PACE ENvmoNmENTAL LAw
REvIEw).
116. Letters from David R. Doerr, Chief Tax Consultant, California Taxpay-
ers' Association (May 3, 1993), Ronald C. Myron, Executive Vice President,
Western Liquid Gas Association (Apr. 23, 1993), Chris Micheli, Tax & Corpo-
rate Counsel, California Manufacturers Association (May 5, 1993), Joel D. An-
derson, Executive Vice President, California Trucking Association (May 5,
1993) to Tom Bates, California Assembly Member (on file with the PACE ENVI-
RONmENTAL LAw REvixw).
117. Interview with Chris Calwell, Natural Resources Defense Council, in
San Francisco, Cal. (1993).
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nues and earmarked state fluds, and extending the sales tax
increment for a further six months.118
A possible barrier to the Bates proposal, and other car-
bon tax proposals in California, is a state constitutional re-
quirement that the proceeds of motor fuel taxes be used for
transportation-related purposes. 119 Nearly one third of reve-
nues associated with the Bates proposal were estimated to
come from motor gasoline alone. Supporters of the proposal
argued that the tax was not a motor fuel tax per se, but an
emissions tax. This matter would likely have been contested
in the courts if the bill had passed.
2. Investing in Environmental Technologies
As part of a project on pollution prevention and renewa-
ble energy in the Los Angeles air basin, the Center for Global
Change developed a proposal for a small carbon tax to finance
a California environmental technology flud.1 20 The purposes
of the fund would be to speed commercialization of emerging
zero-emission technologies in the energy sector and to pro-
mote technological leadership and economic growth for
California.
Renewable energy technologies have declined in cost dra-
matically over the past decade, partly due to the innovative
regulatory and legislative policies of California. The future
cost of these technologies will be influenced heavily by pres-
ent investment levels. The regulated utility sector, however,
tends to invest at a low level in the commercialization of new
technologies. Moreover, California's high electricity prices
limit the potential for continued investments at the expense
of ratepayers. Aggressive development of end use renewable
technologies and renewable electric generation coupled with
an electrification strategy can help solve California's air qual-
ity problems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed,
only by expanding the renewable share of electricity genera-
118. See S.B. 509, Reg. Sess., 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 73.
119. CAL. CONST. Art. XIX, § 1.
120. FRANK MULLER & HARVEY M. SACHS, CENTER FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, A
REPORT FOR THE SOUTH COAST Am QuALrrY MANAGEmENT DIsTmIT (Jan. 1993).
[Vol. 12
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tion will California be able to fully realize the environmental
benefits of its efforts to promote electric vehicles. A small car-
bon tax can provide funds for investment in the comerciali-
zation of renewable technologies while spreading the cost
across all energy users.
The proposed California environmental technology fund
would be financed through a $3.75 carbon tax which would
generate about $450 million per year in California. 121 This
tax would translate into 1 cent per gallon on gasoline, 6 mills
per therm on natural gas and an average of 0.4 mills per kilo-
watt hour on electricity. The fund would provide incentives
for commercial projects involving selected near-competitive
technologies. Incentives would be provided on an expanding
volume/declining incentive basis through long-term competi-
tive contracts running from five to ten years. Candidate tech-
nologies include advanced renewable electric generation,
photovoltaic charging systems for electric vehicles and solar
thermal end use technologies.
California's lead in renewable energy technologies is cur-
rently being challenged by European and Japanese compa-
nies aided by supportive government policies. For example,
the German government provides a 4 cent per kilowatt hour
production credit for new wind projects 122, whereas the Fed-
eral Energy Policy Act of 1992 provides only a 1.5 cent credit
for the same type of projects.1 23 The proposed carbon tax
would therefore serve both competitive and environmental
purposes.124
C. Minnesota
In 1990 the Minnesota Legislature requested a report
from the state's Pollution Control Agency and Department of
Natural Resources on the status of and possible incentives to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions in Minnesota. 125 The result-
121. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
122. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, THE RoLE OF IEA GovERNMENs IN
ENERGY (1992).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 13317(e) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
124. MULLER & SACHS, supra note 120.
125. 1990 MiNN. LAws ch. 587, § 2.
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ing report proposed a tree planting program to be funded by a
fee on carbon dioxide emissions. 126 In 1991, the Legislature
formally established a tree planting program, Minnesota
ReLeaf, and requested a further report from the Pollution
Control Agency with an implementation plan and recommen-
dations for a fee structure. 2 7 This report, released in Decem-
ber 1991, recommends introducing a "carbon content fee,"
which is essentially a carbon tax on fossil fuels, at a rate of 60
cents per ton of carbon. 128 It discusses implementation is-
sues and includes draft legislation for the proposed fee. The
legislature did not act on this proposal. Although tree plant-
ing can help slow global warming and improve urban air
quality, it does little to reduce energy imports or boost com-
petitiveness. Using carbon tax revenues for investment in
energy efficient infrastructure and technologies promises
longer term benefits and offers greater potential for linking
energy, economic and air quality goals.
The carbon taxes initiatives continued in April 1992 as a
bill known as the Sustainable Energy Transition Bill was in-
troduced into both houses of the legislature. 29 Revenues
from a proposed $6 per ton carbon tax would be used for the
development of a Minnesota sustainable energy transition
strategy, for energy assistance and energy efficiency pro-
grams for low income families (at least 15% of revenues), and
for financing energy efficiency and renewable energy pro-
grams and capital investments (at least 80% of revenue).130
The tax would raise about $150 million per year.' 3 ' The bill
was not considered during the 1992 session of the Minnesota
legislature, but was reintroduced in 1993 at the lower tax
126. DIVISION OF FORESTRY, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, CARBON DIOXIDE BUDGErS IN MINNESOTA AND RECOmmENDATIONS ON
REDUCING NET EMISSIONS WITH TREES: REPORT TO THE M.INNESOTA LEGISLA-
TURE (1991).
127. 1991 MINN. LAWs ch. 88, §§ 20-22.
128. MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, CARBON FEES TO SUPPORT
PRoJEcT RELEAF: IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS - REPORT TO THE MINNE-
SOTA DEPARTmENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES (1991).
129. 1992 Mnmi. H.F. 3054, 1992 Minn. S.F. 2803.
130. Id.
131. DAVID MORRIS, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, MAKING THE POL-
LUTER PAY: THE CASE FOR A MINNESOTA CARBoN TAx 5 (1991).
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/2
POLLUTION TAX FORUM
rate of $2 per ton.132 Although a committee hearing was held
in the State senate, the bill was not reported out of commit-
tee. It is expected the proposal will be revived again during
the 1994 legislative session.
VIl. Conclusion
The prices paid by consumers do not reflect the true so-
cial costs of energy use. Many countries are considering the
restructuring of energy taxes to reflect differences in environ-
mental impact. A carbon tax is likely to be a cost-effective
way of achieving reductions in emissions of both conventional
air pollutants and carbon dioxide.
Political debate over a carbon tax and other energy taxes
in the United States has lagged behind discussions in other
countries. However, an array of fiscal and environmental
challenges facing governments and voter resistance to income
and sales taxes is likely to stimulate growing interest in such
taxes. Modest carbon taxes may be an attractive option for
addressing both environmental and fiscal concerns in a
number of states. A carbon tax proposal was seriously con-
sidered in Maryland in 1992, and another generated consid-
erable interest in California in 1993. These and other
examples of legislative initiatives from Minnesota and Cali-
fornia illustrate that various options are available to use car-
bon taxes for environmental programs and for general
revenue purposes. State carbon taxes are a potential valua-
ble addition to the arsenal of state energy taxes. State adop-
tion of such taxes would be a valuable step toward
rationalizing state energy taxation and incorporating envi-
ronmental values into state tax systems.
132. Interview with David Morris, Institute for Local Self Reliance (1993).
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Appendix 1
COMPARISON OF STATE AN NATIONAL C02 EMISsIoNs
DO STATES MATTER?
(million tons of C02)
Rank Nation/State Emissions Rank Nation/State Emissions
1 United States 5,328.7 62 Sweden 63.7
2 U.S.S.R. 4,116.3 63 Pakistan 63.4
3 China 2,517.2 64 Maryland 63.4
4 Japan 1,069.3 65 Colorado 59.0
5 India 695.5 66 Iowa 57.5
6 Germany, Dem. Rep. 692.5 67 Arizona 56.8
7 United Kingdom 618.9 68 South Carolina 56.2
8 Texas 568.7 69 Colombia 55.9
9 Canada 495.7 70 Finland 55.7
10 Poland 477.8 71 Austria 54.4
11 Italy 409.6 72 United Arab Emirates 54.2
12 France 380.5 73 Malaysia 51.4
13 Mexico 339.5 74 Wyoming 51.4
14 California 322.5 75 Denmark 50.7
15 South Africa 302.2 76 Norway 50.0
16 Australia 280.3 77 Utah 49.1
17 Czechoslovakia 243.5 78 New Mexico 48.9
18 Pennsylvania 232.7 79 Algeria 47.7
19 South Korea 227.0 80 Arkansas 46.9
20 Romania 226.2 81 Mississippi 45.8
21 Ohio 222.7 82 Philippines 43.0
22 Brazil 214.4 83 Portugal 41.8
23 Spain 210.6 84 Switzerland 40.3
24 Louisiana 188.0 85 Libya 40.2
25 New York 187.8 86 North Dakota 40.0
26 Indiana 187.5 87 Singapore 38.6
27 Saudi Arabia 186.3 88 Israel 35.0
28 Illinois 184.4 89 Connecticut 34.9
29 Iran 176.2 90 Kuwait 34.4
30 Florida 170.3 91 Alaska 31.8
31 Michigan 161.6 92 Ireland 31.5
32 North Korea 161.2 93 Nebraska 29.8
33 Indonesia 144.1 94 Syria 29.1
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Appendix 1 (continued)
COMPARISON OF STATE AND NATIONAL CO2 EMISSIONS
DO STATES MATTER?
(million tons of C0 2)
Rank Nation/State Emissions Rank Nation/State Emissions
34 Yugoslavia 141.8 95 Oregon 28.4
35 Netherlands 135.8 96 New Zealand 28.3
36 Argentina 127.8 97 Nevada 27.9
37 Georgia 126.8 98 Montana 25.3
38 Turkey 125.9 99 Trinidad & Tobago 20.3
39 Bulgaria 114.9 100 Hawaii 20.0
40 Kentucky 108.7 101 Maine 16.5
41 Belgium 104.4 102 Ecuador 15.8
42 New Jersey 104.2 103 [Delaware 15.4
43 Venezuela 103.2 104 1Qatar 14.5
44 Alabama 101.8 105 Bahrain 13.4
45 West Virginia 98.6 106 New Hampshire 13.0
46 North Carolina 98.2 107 South Dakota 10.4
47 Tennessee 97.0 108 Idaho 10.3
48 Missouri 94.8 109 Luxembourg 9.9
49 Nigeria 85.4 110 Gabon 8.5
50 Virginia 84.1 111 Cote d'Ivoire 8.0
51 Egypt 82.3 112 Rhode Island 7.4
52 Oklahoma 79.6 113 Vermont 4.8
53 Thailand 77.4 114 Cyprus 4.1
54 Wisconsin 77.4 115 Dist. of Columbia 4.0
55 Massachusetts 74.1 116 Costa Rica 2.5
56 Greece 71.0 117 Guinea-Bissau 2.5
57 Minnesota 70.6 118 Nicaragua 2.3
58 Iraq 69.1 119 Iceland 2.1
59 Hungary 68.5 120 Malta 1.8
60 Washington 65.9 121 Paraguay 1.7
61 Kansas 64.1 1
State estimates are for 1990 and are calculated by the authors using data
from ENERGY INFO. ADmN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUB. No. 0214, STATE
ENERGY DATA REPORT 1992 (1994). National estimates are for 1989 from
WoRL RESOURCES INsTrruTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1992-93 346-347 (1992),
excluding emissions from cement manufacture. Some countries have
significant CO2 emissions from the destruction of natural carbon sinks, such
as forests, not included here.
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Appendix 3
Estimated Revenue Shares by End Use Sector
Transportation 31%/X
Residential 25%
Commercial 13%
Estimated Revenue by Fuel Type
Coal Nat. Gas Fuel Oil Diesel Gasoline Avn. Fuels Other Electricity
Revenues calculated by authors using state energy consumption data published by U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE/EIA-0214(92))
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